

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Large Aircraft

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York

Category: Large Aircraft

Mission: Bomber/Tanker

One-time Cost: \$120.8 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$61.8 million

Annual: \$39.2 million

Payback: 6 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Griffiss AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah.

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an "as needed, on call" basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When all eight DoD criteria are applied, Griffiss AFB ranked low compared to the other large aircraft bases. Based on this analysis, the application of all eight DoD selection criteria, and excess capacity which results from reduced force structure, Griffiss AFB is recommended for realignment.

The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base in the Northeast to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. Griffiss AFB was evaluated specifically as the location for this wing, along with other bases that met the geographical criteria and were available for this mission: McGuire AFB, New Jersey and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its geographical location, attributes and base loading capacity. Principal mobility attributes include aircraft parking space (for 70-80 tanker/airlift aircraft), fuel hydrants and fuel supply/storage capacity, along with present and future encroachment and airspace considerations.

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work force and is located in adequate facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB. It does not need to be closed or realigned as a result of the reductions in the rest of the base.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign Griffiss AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Griffiss AFB community believed the Air Force should have selected Griffiss AFB as the East Coast Mobility Base rather than Plattsburgh AFB. The community believed some of the information the Air Force used in selecting the East Coast Mobility Base was erroneous, and if the Air Force knew the facts, it would have selected Griffiss AFB. Community officials addressed parking capacity; petroleum, oils, and

lubricants storage; numbers and types of hydrants; and airfield infrastructure at Griffiss AFB. Also addressed were ground and air encroachment problems at Plattsburgh AFB. The community presented information asserting it would be less expensive to establish Griffiss AFB than to establish Plattsburgh AFB as the East Coast Mobility Base.

The community was also very concerned that in realigning Griffiss AFB at this time, DoD could be positioning itself to close one of its tenants, the Rome Laboratory, in the near future.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

As a B-52 bomber base, the Commission found even though Griffiss AFB rated high in criteria 1, 2, and 3, other bomber bases rated higher in overall military value. The Commission found Barksdale AFB rated very high as a B-52 base, and the Air Force had selected Barksdale AFB to be the B-52 combat crew training base. Minot AFB, which the Commission rated high as a B-52 bomber base, also had additional military value as a missile field. The Commission rated Griffiss AFB very high as a tanker base in criteria 1, 2, and 3, but other installations, including Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB, had higher overall military value. The Air Force announced the selection of Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB as major receiver sites for tankers. Fairchild AFB had increased overall military value because it hosts the Air Force Survival School and Grand Forks AFB had the additional military value of a missile field.

The Commission requested that the Air Force comment on the community concern that in realigning Griffiss AFB at this time, DoD appears to be positioning itself to close the Rome Laboratory in the near future. In a May 7, 1993 letter to the Commission, Mr. James Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, stated "the Air Force has no plans to close or relocate the Rome Laboratory within the next five years."

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Griffiss

AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah. The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss AFB in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an "as needed, on call" basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain.

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan

Category: Large Aircraft

Mission: Bomber

One-time Cost: \$143.6 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$167.3 million

Annual: \$62.4 million

Payback: 4 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft instead of implementing the previous Base Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, to K.I. Sawyer AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There are several factors which resulted in the above recommendation. The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The Air Force must maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with

respect to START II. This requires the retention of the ballistic missile fields at Malmstrom AFB, Grand Forks AFB, Minot AFB, and F.E. Warren AFB. It is more economical to retain a bomber/missile base that must remain open for missiles than to maintain a bomber-only base. Therefore, based on the facts that K.I. Sawyer AFB does not support ballistic missile operations, that when all eight DoD criteria are applied K.I. Sawyer AFB ranks low, and that there is excess large aircraft base capacity, K.I. Sawyer AFB is recommended for closure.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to close K.I. Sawyer AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Air Force did not compare large and small aircraft bases. If it had, the Air Force would have realized K.I. Sawyer AFB would make an outstanding base for the future because access to airspace in the Upper Peninsula region is unencumbered, and the base is strategically located for deployment to potential trouble spots around the globe. The community also challenged the Air Force decision to keep bomber bases with missile fields open instead of bomber-only bases such as K.I. Sawyer AFB. The community said this decision potentially hurts the survivability of two legs of the triad, and K.I. Sawyer AFB should remain open as a bomber base to increase the targeting problem of a potential adversary.

The community was also very concerned about the potential unemployment in the region if K.I. Sawyer AFB closed. The unemployment figures in the community were projected to be approximately 24%, which could devastate the local economy. Also, the community argued the Secretary of Defense did not consider the cumulative economic impact to the region, including the closure of Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, in the 1991 round of base closures, and Kincheloe AFB, Michigan, in an earlier round of base closures.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found K.I. Sawyer AFB did not rate as high in criteria 1, 2, and 3 as other B-52 bases. The Commission found Barksdale AFB rated very high as a B-52 base, and the Secretary of the Air Force selected Barksdale AFB to be the B-52 combat crew training base. Minot AFB, which the Commission rated relatively high as a B-52 base, also had the additional military value of a missile field. As a small aircraft base, the Commission evaluated K.I. Sawyer AFB in criteria 1, 2, and 3 and found it had a rating lower than all other small-aircraft bases. As a tanker base, the Commission rated K.I. Sawyer AFB moderately high in Criteria 1, 2, and 3, but other installations, including Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB, had higher overall military value. Fairchild AFB had the Air Force Survival School and a higher one-time cost to close and Grand Forks AFB had the additional military value of a missile field.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft instead of implementing the previous Base Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, to K.I. Sawyer AFB.

March Air Force Base, California

Category: Large Aircraft

Mission: Tanker

One-time Cost: \$134.8 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$53.8 million

Annual: \$46.9 million

Payback: 2 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

March AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There are several factors which resulted in the above recommendation. First, the Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Also, when all eight DoD criteria were applied to the large aircraft bases, March AFB ranked low. The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base (KC-10, C-5 and C-141 aircraft) on the west coast. When bases in the region (Beale AFB, California; Fairchild AFB, Washington; March AFB, California; McChord AFB, Washington; Malmstrom AFB, Montana; Travis AFB, California) were analyzed for this mission, Travis AFB ranked highest. March AFB currently requires a large active duty component to support a relatively small active duty force structure. The conversion of March AFB to a reserve base achieves substantial savings and

the benefit of a large recruiting population for the Air Force Reserve is retained.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign March AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued March AFB should remain an active-duty base because of its strategic location and its importance to the defense of the U.S. Further, the community maintained the base was a vital onload point for US Marines in support of Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Operation Restore Hope. The community also argued future Marine Corps rapid deployment requirements would not be met with only a reserve capability at March AFB. Further, the community pointed out there has been approximately \$200M in construction at the base in the past few years. The community also noted the Air Force incorrectly graded numerous subelements that were used in evaluating the large aircraft bases. The community noted further that the base has a modern, state-of-the-art hydrant refueling system. The community also took issue with the CHAMPUS savings in the COBRA model, maintaining there were higher costs, not savings, which reduced the overall savings anticipated by the realignment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found March AFB, California, ranked low in military value due to its location in a highly congested airspace environment. While the base has been used as the onload point for

U.S. Marine deployments, the realignment of active-duty resources would not restrict future use of the base for airlift of the Marine forces. The majority of military construction (MILCON) funds expended at March AFB recently has been for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard facilities which will continue to be needed. In addition, other MILCON funds have been expended for organizational realignments from the 1988 base closure actions. (These organizations would also be remaining at March AFB.) The Commission found no significant disparity in the CHAMPUS documentation. While the Commission agrees some grading errors may have been made in the Air Force report, the adjustments to those color grades did not materially change the overall rating of March AFB.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: March AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain at March.

McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey

Category: Large Aircraft

Mission: Airlift

One-time Cost: N/A

Savings: 1994-99: N/A

Annual: N/A

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign McGuire AFB, NJ. The 438th Airlift Wing will inactivate. Most of the C-141s will transfer to Plattsburgh AFB, NY. Fourteen C-141s will remain and transfer to the Air Force Reserve. The 514th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), the 170th Air Refueling Group Air National Guard (ANG), and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain and the base will convert to a Reserve base. The 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) will relocate from Willow Grove Naval Air Station, PA, to McGuire AFB. The Air Force Reserve will operate the base.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DOD force structure plan. McGuire ranked low when compared to other bases in its category and when it was compared specifically with other airlift bases.

The Air Force plans to establish a large mobility wing base in the Northeast United States to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. McGuire AFB, Griffiss AFB, New York and Plattsburgh AFB, New York were evaluated specifically as possible locations for this wing since all met the geographical criteria. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its location, attributes, and base loading capacity.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued McGuire AFB's capability to support the mobility wing was better than that of Plattsburgh AFB, and McGuire AFB proved its capability during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The community also argued McGuire was strategically located to reach Europe with fully loaded C-141s without refueling. They also asserted Plattsburgh AFB could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. The community noted McGuire could accommodate the mobility wing assets for less cost than Plattsburgh AFB.

Further, the community argued McGuire AFB was incorrectly downgraded for ground and airspace encroachment, and training was not encumbered as indicated by the Air Force. Other concerns raised by the community included encroachment of the accident potential zone at Plattsburgh AFB.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found McGuire AFB's training limitations were successfully managed. A new air mobility wing would be able to meet its total mission requirements based at McGuire AFB. DoD did not adequately consider the military value of McGuire AFB in its assessment of the extent of the impact of airspace problems and the base's contribution during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or potential similar contingency operations. Further, the cost to realign McGuire was understated in the Air Force report. While an increase in civil aviation is very likely to occur, the increased mission activity could be accommodated with continued airspace management by the Federal Aviation Administration. Also, although there were sufficient alternatives for providing fuel to Plattsburgh AFB in the wintertime, the fuel delivery costs were approximately 5.6 times more expensive annually at Plattsburgh AFB than at McGuire AFB. This increased cost of fuel delivery at Plattsburgh AFB, not originally considered in cost computations, makes the base a more attractive closure option than realigning McGuire. In addition, McGuire AFB is closer to customers of the military airlift system, prospective contingency onload points, and is in the heart of the northeast surface transportation systems.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain McGuire AFB as an active installation. The 438th and 514th Airlift Wings, the 170th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain at McGuire AFB. Move the 19 KC-10 aircraft from Barksdale AFB to McGuire AFB. Move the requisite number of KC-135 aircraft to establish the east

coast mobility base at McGuire AFB. The C-130 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) remains at Willow Grove NAS, PA. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York

Category: Large Aircraft

Mission: Tanker

One-time Cost: \$131.2 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$137.1 million

Annual: \$56.6 million

Payback: 3 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The opposing community argued that McGuire AFB had the capability to support the mobility wing better than Plattsburgh and McGuire AFB had proven its capability during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. McGuire is strategically located to reach Europe with fully loaded C-141s without refueling. Opposing communities also argued Plattsburgh AFB could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. The McGuire community also noted McGuire AFB could accommodate the mobility wing assets for less cost than it would take at Plattsburgh AFB. The opposing communities also pointed out the Air Force had failed to properly recognize significant ground encroachment at Plattsburgh AFB. The Plattsburgh community disputed the relative importance of the fuel resupply issue, arguing the base could be refueled anytime, although there had been no previous requirement to do so. Additionally, the Plattsburgh community disputed the relative importance of ground encroachment and argued Plattsburgh was being judged on a double standard regarding the encroachment. The Plattsburgh community stressed the importance of their superior ramp space and superb quality of life.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found Plattsburgh AFB had a relatively small active duty force structure supported by a large installation and support organization. Also, the base can be closed with relatively low costs with high returns for a short payback period. Plattsburgh AFB is located some distance from normal airlift customers and onload points, increasing the cost of annual operations. Further, annual fuel resupply to Plattsburgh AFB to support the proposed east coast mobility wing were estimated at \$11.8M, approximately 460% higher than at McGuire AFB. The Air Force's Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) program, a voluntary program for communities, provides guidelines for land development near Air Force installations for public safety. There was concern with the continued commercial development in the North Accident Potential Zone II (APZ II). Though the Air Force has a very good accident record, a large airlift/tanker aircraft accident in this area could be catastrophic.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Plattsburgh AFB and redistribute assets as appropriate. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Small Aircraft

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Small Aircraft

Mission: Power Projection, F-16

One-time Cost: \$42.1 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$357.5 million

Annual: \$71.0 million

Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Homestead AFB, Florida, is recommended for closure. The 31st Fighter Wing will inactivate. All F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy will move to

Lackland AFB, Texas. The Air Force Water Survival School will be temporarily located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the Water Survival School is dependent upon efforts to consolidate its functions with the US Navy. The 301st Rescue Squadron, Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will move to Patrick AFB, Florida. The 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) will move to MacDill AFB, Florida and convert to KC-135Rs. The NORAD alert activity will move to an alternate location. The 726th Air Control Squadron will relocate to Shaw AFB. The Naval Security Group will consolidate with other US Navy units. All DoD activities and facilities including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange facilities will close. All essential cleanup and restoration activities associated with Hurricane Andrew will continue until completed. If Homestead AFB resumes operations as a civilian airport, the NORAD alert facility may be rebuilt in a cantonment area.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There were several factors which resulted in the closure recommendation. First, the Air Force has one more small aircraft base than is required to support the fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When the data were evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria, Homestead AFB ranked low relative to the other bases in the small aircraft subcategory. While Homestead AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, one stood out: the excessive cost to rebuild Homestead, while other small aircraft bases required little or no new investment. The cost to close Homestead AFB is low, especially when measured against the high cost of reconstruction, and the long-term savings are substantial.

All small aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance. Bases were evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general

officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to close Homestead AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community highlighted the military value of Homestead's proximity to Cuba, both as a deterrent to possible aggression and for staging combat and contingency operations in the southern region and against Cuba. The community described the situation where Hurricane Andrew effectively closed Homestead in August 1992, when base personnel evacuated and did not return. Damage caused by Hurricane Andrew denied the local region time to adjust to normal base closure actions during a time of severe economic devastation. The community disagreed with the Department of Defense assessment of 1% economic impact on the area. The community believed the Air Force understated costs for moving the 482d Fighter Wing to MacDill as part of Homestead's cost to close. The community agreed the cost to fully restore Homestead was excessive, but supplemental appropriations for rebuilding the base would adequately cover the cost of building a reserve cantonment area, allowing the return of both reserve units, the Water Survival School, and the alert facility. These funds were held in abeyance by the Air Force pending the 1993 base-closure decisions and were not considered in Homestead's scenario cost comparisons. The community also argued that base-operating costs associated with reopening MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, operated by the 482d Fighter Wing, were not factored in Homestead's cost to close and would exceed operating costs of a cantonment area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the military value of Homestead AFB's location was indeed high, due to its strategic location, but this did not justify rebuilding the base to its previous capabilities. The Commission found the community erred in its cost-saving analysis by mixing operations and maintenance funds with military construc-

tion funds, the supplemental allocation funds combined with savings from not moving the units were sufficient to rebuild facilities for the Air Force Reserve's 482d Fighter Wing, the North American Air Defense alert detachment, and the Water Survival School. When combined with savings from military construction cost avoidance for rebuilding the 31st Fighter Wing facilities at Homestead, the 301st Rescue Squadron facilities could also be rebuilt. The Commission's cost analysis showed more savings for rebuilding facilities to house F-16 aircraft, not KC-135R aircraft, because support facilities for KC-135Rs would be approximately \$29,600,000 more than rebuilding facilities for F-16s.

The Commission found rebuilding the Water Survival School facilities at Homestead AFB was affordable, but reestablishing that unit would necessitate reopening Homestead as an active duty air force base with attendant increased requirements for facilities to house and support active-duty military personnel, actions which were not cost effective.

The Commission found rebuilding the 301st Rescue Squadron facilities was affordable, and the Air Force could enhance combat mission integration and effectiveness by collocating these two synergistic reserve component combat units. The Commission found the Space Shuttle support mission the unit currently performs is secondary to its primary tasking, and current Space Shuttle mission requirements for the unit could be supported from Homestead AFB.

The Commission found the Air Force did not include operating costs for opening MacDill AFB in its closing-cost analysis and thus overestimated savings from closing Homestead AFB. The Commission also found, although the projected employment loss was only 1% of the Miami-Hialeah Metropolitan Statistical Area, the actual economic impact was concentrated in the less densely populated South Dade County where damage from Hurricane Andrew was more concentrated and where Homestead AFB is located. The economic impact from this closure to South Dade County was 6.5%.

Finally, the Commission found that it would be more economical for Dade County to operate Homestead AFB as a civil airport with the Air Force Reserve units as tenants on the base.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 3, 4 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Homestead AFB with the following actions. Inactivate the 31st Fighter Wing; all F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina; move the Inter-American Air Forces Academy to Lackland AFB, Texas; temporarily relocate the Air Force Water Survival School to Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the Water Survival School is dependent upon efforts to consolidate its functions with the Navy. Relocate the 726th Air Control Squadron to Shaw AFB. Consolidate the Naval Security Group with other US Navy units. Close all DoD activities and facilities, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base-exchange facilities. All essential cleanup and restoration activities associated with Hurricane Andrew will be completed. The 482d F-16 Fighter Wing (AFRES) and the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) and the North American Air Defense alert activity will remain in cantonment areas. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Air Force Reserve

O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station, Illinois

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Airlift and Tanker
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close O'Hare ARS as proposed by the City of Chicago and relocate the assigned Air Reserve Component (ARC) units to the Greater Rockford Airport, or another location acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force, provided the City can demonstrate that it has the financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities, moving, and environmental cleanup, without any

cost whatsoever to the federal government and that the closure/realignment must begin by July 1995 and be completed by July 1997. Chicago would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare International Airport.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

O'Hare Reserve Station is in the Northwest corner of O'Hare International Airport, enjoying immediate access to two runways. Two ARC units are based there: the 928th Airlift Group (Air Force Reserve), with C-130s; and the 126th Air Refueling Wing (Air National Guard), with KC-135s. An Army Reserve Center is located adjacent to the base. In addition, a large Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) activity currently occupies a government owned, recently renovated office building on the base; however, DLA is recommending disestablishment of this activity to other locations as part of the 1993 base closure process.

In a 1991 land exchange agreement, intended to resolve all real property issues between the Air Force and the City of Chicago at O'Hare International Airport, the City specifically agreed that it would seek no more land from the O'Hare ARS. The Air Force has advised the City that the ARC units are adequately housed at O'Hare, and there is no basis for moving them. There are no savings from moving; only costs. To justify this realignment under the DoD Base Closure Selection Criteria, all costs of closure/realignment would have to be funded entirely outside the federal government. (For example, no DoD or FAA funds). The relocation site would have to meet all operating requirements, such as runway length and freedom from noise-related operating limitations, and be close enough to Chicago that the units would not suffer major loss of personnel. The day-to-day operating costs at the relocation site would have to compare favorably with those at O'Hare International Airport.

The City proposes that the ARC units move to Greater Rockford Airport, 55 miles northwest of O'Hare International Airport. Virtually no facilities for the units exist at Rockford, so an entirely new base would have to be constructed. The airfield is constrained on two sides by the

Rock River and flood plain. At least one runway will have to be extended for KC-135 operations. There appear to be noise and other environmental problems to resolve before a final determination of siting feasibility can be made.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Some community groups supported the realignment of O'Hare ARS, while others opposed it; however, all involved wanted the units to stay in Illinois. The opposition groups claimed the unit combat effectiveness would be adversely impacted by loss of personnel and a diminished recruiting population base outside the Chicago metropolitan area. The opposition groups argued the City of Chicago had no financial plan and had not determined costs to rebuild replacement facilities for the reserve units. Furthermore, assurances were initially made to avoid costs to DoD, but not to the federal government. The opposition also argued costs to relocate were excessive because there were no other runways in Illinois long enough to handle the KC-135 aircraft and the proposed site at the Greater Rockford Airport currently had no unit facilities.

The groups supporting the O'Hare ARS realignment believed other sites would provide adequate populations for recruiting. The groups also claimed moving the units to a less-congested location would increase training opportunities and allow for future unit expansion. The current use of the airport land as a military installation is inefficient, and the realignment of the base would allow economic development, increase the number of jobs, and improve airport efficiency. The City of Chicago asserted the time constraints were unrealistic and the Secretary of Defense recommendation should be changed to allow completion of the move by 1999 as the statute allows. The supporting organizations claimed no Department of Defense funds would be spent for unit relocations, but federal funds could be spent for normal civil aviation improvements to facilitate the transfer. In addition, the groups claimed federal policy promoting conversion of military bases to civil aviation was relevant in this situation.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found although the units were adequately housed at O'Hare Air Reserve Station, the community's desire to move the units undermines the typical community-base support relationship found at other bases, and could be detrimental to future mission accomplishments. The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the relocation must be at no cost to the federal government and that financial plans must include the receiving community's contributions toward this relocation. The Commission found flying operations were impeded during adverse weather due to basing on the world's busiest airport. Additionally, local visual flight training was conducted at remote fields due to traffic congestion at Chicago O'Hare. The Commission found all military construction was halted at O'Hare ARS in response to closure actions thus affecting maintenance of the base and potentially affecting flying operations, if the Air Force subsequently rejects relocation sites. The Commission found there would be a smaller population base from which to recruit, likely impacting unit manning. These additional costs to replace personnel would not be recoverable from the City of Chicago, but should not significantly impact unit combat capability.

The Commission found the City of Chicago did not plan for moving the Army Reserve activity adjacent to the base, but must include that unit in future expansion proposals.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close O'Hare ARS as proposed by the City of Chicago and relocate the assigned Air Reserve Component (ARC) units to the Greater Rockford Airport, or another location acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force (in consultation and agreement with the receiving location), provided the City of Chicago can demonstrate that it has the financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities (except for FAA grants for airport planning and

development that would otherwise be eligible for federal financial assistance to serve the needs of civil aviation at the receiving location), environmental impact analyses, moving, and any added costs of environmental cleanup resulting from higher standards or a faster schedule than DoD would be obliged to meet if the base did not close, without any cost whatsoever to the federal government, and further provided that the closure/realignment must begin by July 1995 and be completed by July 1998. Chicago would also have to fund the cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare International Airport. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Other Air Force Bases

Gentile Air Force Station Dayton, Ohio

Category: Air Force Station

Mission: Principal and host organization is the Defense Electronics Supply Center. In addition there are over 20 tenant activities.

One-Time Cost: N/A

Savings: 1994-99: N/A

Annual: N/A

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community was primarily interested in retaining the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) as the host on Gentile AFS. It argued keeping DESC at Gentile AFS was more cost effective than relocating the mission to Columbus, Ohio, as recommended by DoD.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found closing the Defense Electronics Supply Center and relocating it at the Defense Construction Supply Center, along

with most of the other Gentile Air Force Station tenants, streamlined operations and cut cost. However, the Defense Switching Network will remain as the sole tenant of Gentile Air Force Station, with the possibility of being phased out within three to four years. The Commission did not ascertain costs associated with closure of Gentile AFS. The closure would be relatively inexpensive because Gentile is a small installation, owned by the Air Force (Wright Patterson AFB), which would be vacant except for the automatic switching center.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio, except for space required to operate the Defense Switching Network. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Air Force Depots

Newark Air Force Base, Ohio

Category: Depot

Mission: Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center

One-time Cost: \$ 31.3 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$-17.1 million (cost)

Annual: \$ 3.8 million

Payback: 8 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Newark AFB, Ohio, is recommended for closure. The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) depot will be closed; some workload will move to other depot maintenance activities including the private sector. We anticipate that most will be privatized in place.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Due to significant reductions in force structure, the Air Force has an excess depot maintenance capacity of at least 8.7 million Direct Product Actual Hours (DPAH). When all eight criteria

are applied to the bases in the depot subcategory, Newark AFB ranked low in comparison to the other five depot bases. The long-term military value of the base is low because it does not have an airfield and it is not a traditional Air Force base in any respect. Instead, it is a stand-alone, highly technical, industrial plant that is operated predominantly by a civilian workforce. As a result, it is conducive to conversion to the private sector. The closure of Newark AFB will reduce the Air Force excess depot capacity by 1.7 million DPAH and is consistent with OSD guidance to reduce excess capacity, economize depot management, and increase competition and privatization in DoD.

All six Air Force depots were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base hosting an Air Force depot was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases, depots, and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of these bases under each criterion, was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group). The Executive Group is a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). SECAF made the decision to close Newark AFB with the advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the facilities at Newark AFB were unique, and replication of the workload elsewhere was not cost-effective. The community believed the facility was the single center for repair of strategic-missile guidance systems and certain aircraft inertial navigation systems and, therefore, should remain open. The community also maintained the seismic stability of the facility was critical to both repair functions, and Newark AFB was the only center available to meet these requirements.

Additionally, the community believed privatization could not be accomplished without significant cost to the USAF, and was not economically feasible. The community also believed the base was unfairly penalized for absence of a runway. Community officials argued a runway was not needed for the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center mission; in fact, it would jeopardize seismic stability. Additionally, cross-utilization of personnel capable of repairing both inertial-navigation and inertial-guidance systems was critical during crises as proven during the base's support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The community also argued it was inconsistent to retain Minuteman III bases, yet privatize the only guidance system repair capability for this weapon system.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the workload at Newark AFB is not unique. Contractor facilities presently have the repair capability and have been doing it for years. The workload can either be contracted out to one or more of several existing manufacturers or privatized in place. It appears industry interest in privatization in place is limited. Thus, if privatization is not a viable option, the Air Force can contract the required workload incrementally as the workload at Newark declines. Additionally, in response to the community's question regarding being penalized for lack of a runway, the Commission found Newark AFB did not receive a negative rating for lack of a runway, thus there was no negative impact to the base's overall performance rating.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Newark AFB, Ohio is recommended for closure. The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) depot will be closed; some workload will move to other depot maintenance activities including the private sector.

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Air Force Reserve

Mission: Power Projection

One-time Cost: N/A

Savings: 1994-99: N/A

Annual: N/A

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Bergstrom AFB as follows: The 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas and the cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB will close. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom AFB will be closed by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian air port authority elects to assume the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended the closure of Bergstrom AFB. The AFRES was to remain in a cantonment area. In reviewing AFRES plans for Bergstrom AFB, the Air Force found that considerable savings could be realized by realigning the Bergstrom AFRES units and aircraft to the Carswell AFB cantonment area. This realignment will result in savings in Military Construction (MILCON) funds, reduced manpower costs, and will not significantly impact unit readiness. The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost \$12.5 million in MILCON to construct a cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB. Based on the best estimates available at this time, the cost of this change is \$5.8 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$6.7 million. This action will also result in net manpower savings.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community believed the F-16 reserve squadron and its support units should remain in a cantonment area on Bergstrom AFB which will

be operated by the city of Austin as a municipal airport. Austin city officials pointed out the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report clearly states: "the Air Force Reserves units shall remain in the Bergstrom cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport, and if no decision is made by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed." On May 1, 1993, the citizens of Austin overwhelmingly approved a \$400 million bond referendum to relocate the municipal airport to Bergstrom AFB; therefore, the city argued, the Air Force is committed to leaving the reserve units at Bergstrom.

In a report dated May 26, 1993, the community also suggested that a more sensible decision would be to not only retain the reserve units at Bergstrom, but to move the Air Force reserve units from Carswell AFB to Bergstrom. The community contended this decision would improve operational readiness, result in significant MILCON savings (\$57 million), provide vastly superior facilities with expansion room, and alleviate air-space congestion in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Air Force was resolute in its recommendation to move the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units to Carswell AFB, Texas and to close the Bergstrom cantonment area despite any commitments it may have made in 1991. The Air Force believes current circumstances have overtaken the 1991 plan to leave these AFRES units at Bergstrom.

The Commission also found that the City Council of Austin has formally adopted five resolutions since July 1990 indicating the city's commitment to reuse Bergstrom AFB as its municipal airport. On May 1, 1993 the citizens of Austin voted for a bond proposition in the amount of \$400 million to finance moving its municipal airport. The Air Force does not appear to have considered the Austin community's long-term commitment to move its municipal airport to Bergstrom AFB.

The Commission found the Air Force learned the details of the Navy's proposal to move a large number of reserve aircraft to Carswell

after it decided to recommend that the Bergstrom reserve units move to Carswell. The Commission was concerned the Air Force failed to consider the recruiting problems that may exist by moving approximately ten thousand reservists to the Fort Worth area. Competition among the services to recruit qualified technicians will no doubt have an adverse affect on the readiness of these units. Training plans require three to five years for a new affiliate to meet the military services and FAA performance standards. The Commission also had concerns with locating 186 aircraft in an area that has ground-encroachment problems and is in a high density aircraft traffic pattern.

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense recommendation concerning the Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF) was consistent with the selection criteria. If closure is required because the civilian airport authority does not elect to assume responsibility for operating and maintaining the RCCF, the Department of Defense should insure that all reusable equipment and resources from that facility are relocated to the extent economical and practicable.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1, 2, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996. Close or relocate the Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority assumes the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Air Force Reserve

Mission: Power Projection

One-time Cost: \$ 0.3 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$ 1.8 million

Annual: N/A

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Carswell AFB as follows: Transfer the fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. Final disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the Congressionally mandated base exchange and commissary test program.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended that the 436th Training Squadron be relocated to Dyess AFB as a whole. The proposed action will result in more streamlined and efficient training operations. Transferring the fabrication function to Luke AFB will avoid duplicating this function within Air Combat Command. The Hill AFB move will ensure that maintenance training is provided in a more efficient manner.

The original 1991 realignment cost was \$1.8 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The cost for this redirect is \$0.3 million MILCON, for a projected savings of \$1.5 million MILCON.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community viewed the Secretary of Defense's 1993 recommendation to establish Carswell as a joint, master reserve/guard base as a win-win situation that would complement its redevelopment-authority efforts. The community stated the proposed expansion of the cantonment area would not be a problem, since most of the development being considered by the community is south of the expanded cantonment area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the proposed actions involving Dyess, Luke and Hill AFB would result in more streamlined and efficient DoD training operations and avoid duplication of training.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: transfer the fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. Final disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the Congressionally mandated base exchange and commissary test program.

Castle AFB, California

Category: 1991 Closure

Mission: N/A

One-time Cost: \$59.5 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$78.7 million

Annual: N/A

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Castle AFB as follows: Redirect the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training mission from Fairchild AFB, Washington to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (B-52) and Altus AFB, Oklahoma (KC-135).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The force structure upon which the 1991 Commission based its recommendations has changed and B-52 force structure is being reduced. The Air Force currently plans to base a large number of B-52s at two locations, with Barksdale AFB serving as the hub for B-52 operations and training. Similarly, training for mobility operations is being centralized at Altus AFB. This redirect will reduce the number of training sites and improve efficiency of operations.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost \$78.7 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The estimated cost for this redirect to Barksdale and Altus AFBs is \$59.5 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$19.2 million.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the recommended force-structure changes would result in a large number of B-52s at Barksdale AFB. Additionally, Air Mobility Training, to include KC-135s, is being consolidated at Altus AFB. This action would improve efficiency of training and military operations.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost was \$78.7M in MILCON. The estimated cost for this 1993 recommendation is \$59.5M in MILCON for a projected savings of \$19.2M.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: redirect the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training mission from Fairchild AFB, Washington to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (B-52) and Altus AFB, Oklahoma (KC-135).

Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois

Category: 1988 Closure

Mission: N/A

One-time Cost: \$16.4 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$17.5 million

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

As part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, the Air Force recommends consolidating its 16 Metals Technology, Non-Destructive Inspection, and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses with the Navy at Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis, Tennessee, and then move with the Navy when NAS Memphis closes. The 1991 Base Closure Commission recommended that these courses, along with 36 other courses, be transferred to Sheppard AFB, Texas.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

On March 31, 1992, the DoD Inspector General recommended that the Air Force consolidate and collocate its 16 metals training courses with the Navy. There will be no Military Construction (MILCON) costs associated with temporarily relocating the specified training courses to NAS Memphis. This is considerably less than the \$17.5 million in MILCON cost to relocate these courses to Sheppard AFB. As this training is now scheduled to move when NAS Memphis closes, the Air Force and Navy will work to achieve a cost effective approach until a more permanent site is found.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

No formal community concerns were expressed.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found there were no MILCON costs associated with temporarily relocating the specified training courses to NAS Memphis. The Commission did find, however, the Navy had initially indicated a cost of \$16.4 million to relocate this training to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Commission found the training was originally scheduled to move when NAS Memphis closes and, therefore, the Air Force and Navy could work to achieve a more cost-effective approach to insure the efficiencies involved in Joint Service training are realized. Collocation of these courses with the Navy would achieve efficiencies and savings.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: as part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, consolidate the Air Force's 16 Metals Technology, Non-Destructive Inspection, and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses with the Navy at Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis, Tennessee, and then move them with the Navy to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Major Headquarters

*Mission: Headquarters USSOCOM
and USCENTCOM*

One-time Cost: N/A

Savings: 1994-99: \$25.6 million

Annual: N/A

Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding MacDill AFB as follows: The Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will temporarily operate the airfield as a reserve base, not open to civil use, until it can be converted to a civil airport. This will accommodate the recommended reassignment of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) from Homestead AFB to MacDill AFB and its conversion to KC-135 tankers. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) will not be transferred to Charleston AFB, South Carolina as recommended in 1991, but, instead, will remain at MacDill AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended a realignment and partial closure of MacDill AFB. Its F-16 training mission has been relocated to Luke AFB, Arizona, and the JCSE was to be relocated to Charleston AFB. Two unified commands, Headquarters Central Command and Headquarters Special Operations Command, were left in place. The airfield was to close.

Several events since 1991 have made a change to the Commission action appropriate. The closure of Homestead AFB requires the relocation of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES). The best location for this unit, when converted to KC-135s, is MacDill AFB. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) aircraft element has relocated from Miami International Airport to MacDill AFB and would like to remain permanently. NOAA is prepared to pay a fair share of the cost of airport operations.

The AFRES's temporary operation of the airfield will have reduced operating hours and services.

The 1991 Commission noted a number of deficiencies of MacDill AFB as a fighter base: "pressure on air space, training areas, and low level routes...not located near Army units that will offer joint training opportunities...[and]... ground encroachment." These are largely inapplicable to an AFRES tanker operation.

Encroachment remains a problem, but the reduced number of flights and the increased compatibility of both tanker and NOAA aircraft with the predominant types of aircraft using Tampa International Airport make this viable. As an interim Reserve/NOAA airfield, use will be modest, and it will not be open to large-scale use by other military units.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost for the JCSE relocation was \$25.6 million in MILCON. Retaining the JCSE at MacDill AFB avoids this cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the requirement for United States Central Command and United States Special Operations Command to have access to an operational runway would not be met if the 482nd Fighter Wing was returned to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the cost to move the Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE) to Charleston AFB, SC, is \$25.6 million. Retaining the unit at MacDill avoids this cost. MacDill AFB is host to several tenant units that require the use of an operational airfield, including the JCSE, United States Special Operations Command, United States Central Command, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The City of Tampa has stated it has no need for the excess property at MacDill and, therefore, has no plans to assume its operation. The Department of Commerce (DOC), specifically the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has requested a no-cost transfer of the MacDill airfield to DOC control. The Secretary of Defense has indicated approval of the request, and it has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain the Joint Communication Support Element at MacDill as long as the airfield is non-DoD operated. Operation of the airfield at MacDill will be taken over by the Department of Commerce or another Federal agency. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Mather Air Force Base, California

Category: 1988 closure

Mission: N/A

One-time Cost: \$12.5 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$33.7 million

Annual: N/A

Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Mather AFB as follows: Redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California vice McClellan AFB, California. Because of the rapidly approaching closure of Mather AFB, the 940th will temporarily relocate to McClellan AFB, while awaiting permanent beddown at Beale AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Moving the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) to Beale AFB is more cost effective.

The original 1991 realignment cost was \$33.7 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The estimated cost for this redirect is \$12.5 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$21.2 million.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The 1988 Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended the closure of the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital and the retention of the 940th Air Refueling Group at Mather AFB, CA. The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the realignment of the 940th Air Refueling Group from Mather AFB to McClellan AFB, California, and recommended the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital remain open as an annex to McClellan AFB, CA. The 1993 Secretary of Defense recommendation changed the realignment location for the 940th from McClellan AFB, California, to Beale AFB, California. The proposal to redirect the 940th ARG to Beale AFB, California would save \$21.2M in MILCON. Even with the temporary facilities construction costs (\$1.1M) and termination costs (\$3M) at McClellan, the savings are substantial enough to support the Secretary's recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California vice McClellan AFB, California. Because of the rapidly approaching closure of Mather AFB, the 940th will temporarily relocate to McClellan AFB, while awaiting permanent beddown at Beale AFB.

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio

Category: 1991 Closure

Mission: Tanker

One-time Cost: \$.8 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$18.2 million

Annual: N/A

Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rickenbacker ANGB as follows: The 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG)

and the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will move into a cantonment area on the present Rickenbacker ANGB, and operate as a tenant of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on RPA's airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) will realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing will still move to Edwards AFB, California.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended closing Rickenbacker ANGB, and realigning the 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) to Wright-Patterson AFB. These units were to occupy facilities being vacated by the 4950th Test Wing, which will move to Edwards AFB to consolidate test units.

The airfield at Rickenbacker is no longer a military responsibility, having been transferred by long term lease to the RPA in 1992. It will be conveyed in fee under the public benefit authority of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 when environmental restoration is complete. The State of Ohio has proposed that under current circumstances, more money could be saved by leaving the ANG tanker units at Rickenbacker ANGB than by moving it to Wright-Patterson AFB. The Air Force has carefully examined his analysis and concluded that it is correct. The current analysis is less costly than the original estimate of moving both Rickenbacker ANGB units to Wright-Patterson AFB, primarily because of the State's later burden-sharing proposal to lower the ANG's long-term operating costs at Rickenbacker.

In a related force structure move, in order to fully utilize the facilities at Wright-Patterson AFB, the Air Force recommends that the 178th Fighter Group move from the Springfield Municipal Airport, Ohio, to Wright-Patterson AFB, about 30 miles away. This unit will fit into the available facilities with little construction. The move will save approximately \$1.1 million in base operating support annually based on economies of consolidating some ANG functions with AFRES and active Air Force functions at Wright-Patterson. Since the unit moves only a short distance, retention of current personnel should not be a problem.

The 4950th will still move to Edwards AFB, California from Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to take advantage of the enhanced military value through the efficiency of consolidating test assets.

The original 1991 realignment cost was \$37.9 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The cost for this redirect is \$26.2 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$11.7 million.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Rickenbacker airfield, no longer a military responsibility, was transferred by long-term lease to the Rickenbacker Port Authority in 1992. The State of Ohio showed cost savings by leaving the ANG tanker units in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of moving them to Wright-Patterson AFB. The community argued the move of the 178th from Springfield to WPAFB was not cost-effective and jeopardized unit military value. In addition to the cost savings realized by *not* moving to WPAFB, the community asserted significant impacts on recruitment and retention were avoided. By moving to WPAFB, which already has a National Guard recruiting shortfall, the community believed the move would result in personnel problems. The community also argued moving the ANG units from Rickenbacker to Wright-Patterson would impact military readiness because the facilities could not accommodate the units properly.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found moving the ANG units from Rickenbacker ANGB to Wright-Patterson AFB was no longer cost effective. The Secretary of Defense recommendation in 1991 to realign Rickenbacker units to Wright-Patterson AFB was estimated to cost \$49.6 million. This figure included \$21 million in one-time moving costs. In contrast, the total cost to remain at Rickenbacker in a cantonment area, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense in 1993, is estimated at \$32.2 million. When compared to the cost of realignment, a \$17.4 million savings could be realized by retaining the Air National Guard at Rickenbacker.

Additionally, in a related move suggested by the Secretary of Defense, analysis showed it was not cost effective to move the units at

Springfield to Wright-Patterson AFB or to move the 178th from Springfield to WPAFB. The USAF performed a detailed site survey in April 1993, and, on May 4, 1993, provided the preliminary results. The site survey showed the USAF MILCON projections for construction of facilities at WPAFB for the 178th FG were significantly erroneous. Initially, in the March 1993 recommendations to the Commission, DoD estimated the cost to move and beddown the 178th Fighter Group from Springfield ANGB to WPAFB was \$3 million. The updated estimate revealed a \$35 million cost to beddown the 178th at WPAFB. Overall, the data showed a cost of \$26.61M to move the 178th in contrast to an earlier stated savings of \$14.39M which made such a related move uneconomical.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) and the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will move into a cantonment area on the present Rickenbacker ANGB, and operate as a tenant of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on RPA's airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) will realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing will still move to Edwards AFB, California. There is no recommendation by the Secretary of Defense or the Commission to move the 178th Fighter Group; it will stay at Springfield Municipal Airport, Ohio.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Inventory Control Points

Defense Electronics Supply Center Gentile AFS, Ohio

Category: Inventory Control Point

*Mission: Provide wholesale support of
military services with electronic type items*

One-time Cost: \$ 101.2 million

Savings: 1994-99: \$ -47.6 million (cost)

Annual: \$ 23.8 million

Payback: 10 years